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SUMMARY
The paper discusses the concept of a terrorist threat in the light of Article 115 § 20 of the Polish 
Criminal Code. The author stresses the relationship between this term and the punishable threat 
described in the special part of the Criminal Code. The conducted analysis leads to the conclusion 
that the terrorist threat must be treated as a special type of the punishable threat and, as a result, 
many real terrorist threats may not meet the criteria of a forbidden act, e.g. because of the lack of 
an individualised victim. As a result, there appear serious doubts as to whether Polish criminal law 
meets the requirements of EU law referring to the criminalisation of terrorist threats and, therefore, 
the introduction of a new type of offence of a terrorist threat and some changes in Article 115 § 20 
and Article 115 § 12 of the Criminal Code have been proposed.
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The aim of the paper is to analyse the threat to commit an offence of a terrorist 
character as regulated in Article 115 § 20 of the Polish Criminal Code (herein- 
after: CC). Interpreting that provision, in particular as regards punishable threat de-
fined in Article 190 § 1 CC, may pose some interpretation difficulties, which hinder 
the effective application of Article 115 § 20 CC to threats of a terrorist character.
The most important provision related to combating terrorism in Polish law is 
Article 115 § 20 CC containing the definition of offence of a terrorist character. This 
stems from the fact that the legislative technique used by the lawmaker allows all 





prohibited acts that meet the criteria set out in that provision to be considered as such 
an offence, and the attribution of such a character to a given act translates primarily 
into more severe rules for imposing the punishment, set out in Article 65 § 1 CC 
in conjunction with Article 64 § 2 CC. Thus, according to Article 115 § 20 CC, 
the offence of a terrorist character is an act punishable with imprisonment of at 
least 5 years, committed in order to: 1) gravely intimidate many people, 2) force 
a public authority of the Republic of Poland or of any other state or body of an 
international organization to perform or refrain from performing certain activities, 
3) cause serious disturbances in the political system or economy of the Republic of 
Poland, another state or an international organisation, as well as a threat to commit 
such an act.
Before undertaking the analysis of terrorist threat referred to in Article 115 
§ 20 CC, it is worth noting that the need to introduce the category of offences of 
a terrorist character resulted from the Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA 
of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism1. This act is no longer in force as it has been 
replaced by the Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Frame-
work Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA2. 
In both these legal acts, the EU lawmaker decided to use a legislative technique 
different from that adopted in the Polish Criminal Code. Both of the above-men-
tioned acts of EU law list specific types of behaviour which, where the perpetrator 
holds a terrorist motivation, should be regarded as “terrorist offences” (term used 
in the directive) in national law.
Thus, pursuant to Article 3 (1) of the Directive 2017/541, Member States shall 
take the necessary measures to ensure that the following intentional acts, as defined 
as offences under national law, which, given their nature or context, may seriously 
damage a country or an international organisation, are defined as terrorist offences 
where committed with one of the aims listed in paragraph 2:
a) attacks upon a person’s life which may cause death,
b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person,
c) kidnapping or hostage-taking,
d) causing extensive destruction to a government or public facility, a transport 
system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed 
platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property 
likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss,
e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport,
1 OJ L 164, 22.06.2002, p. 3 as amended. This Framework Decision applied until quite recently 
in a form given to it by Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending 
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism (OJ L 330/21, 9.12.2008).
2 OJ L 88/6, 31.03.2017.
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f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of explosives 
or weapons, including chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons, 
as well as research into, and development of, chemical, biological, radio-
logical or nuclear weapons,
g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions, the 
effect of which is to endanger human life,
h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fun-
damental natural resource, the effect of which is to endanger human life,
i) illegal system interference, as referred to in Article 4 of Directive 2013/40/
EU of the European Parliament and of the Council3 in cases where Article 9 
(3) or point (b) or (c) of Article 9 (4) of that Directive applies, and illegal 
data interference, as referred to in Article 5 of that Directive in cases where 
point (c) of Article 9 (4) of that Directive applies,
j) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in points (a) to (i).
According to Article 3 (2), the aims referred to in paragraph 1 are:
a) seriously intimidating a population,
b) unduly compelling a government or an international organisation to perform 
or abstain from performing any act,
c) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, 
economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.
A thorough analysis of the above regulations in terms of punishability of the 
threat to commit one of the terrorist offences listed in Article 3 (1) points (a) to 
(i), as well as its comparison with the wording of the Polish implementation of 
these provisions may lead to certain doubts as to whether the current wording of 
the Polish regulations allows for a proper (or even any) reaction to the “terrorist 
threat”, as understood in Article 3 (1) point (j) of the Directive.
First, it should be noted that in the very editorial terms, Article 115 § 20 CC 
may raise some doubts in the part in which it provides the definition of such 
a threat. The provision states that an offence of a terrorist character is constituted 
by any prohibited act if it is punishable by the sanction specified in Article 115 
§ 20 CC and provided that it is committed to pursue one of the three aims listed 
therein, “as well as a threat to commit such an offence”. When read literally, this 
provision could be understood as meaning that “terrorist threat” is constituted by 
the threatening to commit a specific offence whose aim is the one mentioned in 
this provision – therefore, it is the announced offence, when committed, that would 
lead to the achievement of terrorist aims, such as intimidation of many people, 
or forcing a body of public authority to a specific behaviour, but the threat itself 
3 This regards the Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 August 2013 on attacks against information systems and replacing Council Framework Decision 
2005/222/JHA (OJ L 218/8, 14.08.2013).





would not necessarily have such an aim. In other words, for this form of offence 
of a terrorist character to be committed in practice, the perpetrator should threaten 
that he will commit in the future an offence aimed at causing the effects referred 
to in Article 115 § 20 CC.
The above interpretation could seem fully justified in the light of the very 
wording of the provision – it would be easy to defend the view that “threatening to 
commit such an act” means a threat of committing a terrorist offence, i.e. a threat 
of committing a prohibited act punishable by imprisonment of at least 5 years, 
committed for the purposes listed in Article 115 § 20 CC4.
However, such a method of interpretation may raise serious doubts, for example 
because that interpretation would be contrary to the above-mentioned requirements 
of the directive on combating terrorism, since the wording of Article 3 of that legal 
act clearly stipulates that the mere threatening to commit serious offences referred 
to in the directive already is intended to cause the effects listed in paragraph 2 of 
that provision (moreover, as a side note, it should be pointed out that the reading 
of the provision as proposed above would lead to considerable evidentiary diffi-
culties, as it would be necessary to establish that only when intended the act would 
be committed with a particular aim, while the threatening itself should not have 
any particular motivation). Therefore, accepting the principle of interpreting the 
national law so as to make it compatible, where possible, with the EU law5, it must 
be assumed that the threat itself is to be expressed to achieve one of the three aims 
referred to in Article 115 § 20 CC.
This is also the interpretation of the provision of Article 115 § 20 CC last sen-
tence, which is accepted by the majority of criminal law scholars, who generally 
agree that the purpose of the threat (and not of the announced offence) is to raise 
fear, cause disruption, or enforce a certain behaviour6. This interpretation is, there-
fore, fully compatible with EU requirements in this regard and appears to be the 
most rational in the light of knowledge of the very phenomenon of terrorism and 
terrorist threats. This does not change the fact that these doubts about the manner 
4 Such an interpretation seems to be proposed by J. Giezek ([in:] Kodeks karny. Część ogólna. 
Komentarz, red. J. Giezek, Warszawa 2012, p. 738), who notes that “the offence of a terrorist character 
may occur in two forms: 1) as a prohibited act which cumulatively meets the following conditions: 
a) is punishable with a penalty of at least 5-years in the upper limit, b) has been committed to pursue 
one of the three alternatively specified aims; 2) as an act of threatening to commit an act  meet ing 
the above-mentioned condi t ions [underlined by A.M.W.]”.
5 For more on the obligation of using, where doubts arise, this kind of “pro-EU interpretation”, 
see A. Kalisz, Wykładnia i stosowanie prawa wspólnotowego, Warszawa 2007, pp. 81–82.
6 See, for example: J. Majewski, [in:] Kodeks karny. Część ogólna, t. 2: Komentarz, red. A. Zoll, 
Warszawa 2016, p. 1058; A. Michalska-Warias, [in:] Kodeks karny. Komentarz, red. T. Bojarski, War-
szawa 2016, pp. 324–325, P. Daniluk, [in:] Kodeks karny. Komentarz, red. R.A. Stefański, Warszawa 
2015, p. 716; K. Wiak, [in:] Kodeks karny. Komentarz, red. A. Grześkowiak, K. Wiak, Warszawa 
2018, p. 760.
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of approach to the provision appear to be justified and can only be removed by 
a clear interference by the legislature (when applying this provision in practice, 
there may emerge the question whether its literal wording is more favourable to 
the offender, or a problem of error as to what threats constitute “terrorist threats”7.
However, there are other interpretative difficulties with regard to terrorist threat, 
not addressed much in the literature, perhaps because the problem of a proper 
criminal-law response to the phenomenon of terrorism (fortunately) has not yet 
occurred in the practice of the Polish judiciary. Article 115 § 20 CC uses the term 
“threat”, without specifying what kind of threat it is. The Polish law traditionally 
distinguishes punishable threat and unlawful threat. Article 115 § 20 CC refers 
only to “threat”, but because it is undoubtedly the threat to commit an offence, it 
should be considered that it is a punishable threat or a special kind thereof. That 
type of threat is defined in Article 190 § 1 CC as a threat to commit an offence to the 
detriment of another person or his or her closest person. It should be kept in mind 
that in Article 115 § 20 CC the lawmaker does not create a new type of offence, 
but merely lists a set of additional features of the prohibited act, the occurrence of 
which causes the need to apply to the perpetrator (primarily when imposing the 
punishment and the probation measures), any solutions relating to the perpetrators 
of terrorist offences. Thus, the “terrorist threat” specified in that provision is not 
an independent entity, since for attributing it to the perpetrator it is necessary to 
establish that such a threat fulfilled the statutory criterion of a particular type of 
prohibited act. And this is where quite significant interpretative difficulties relating 
to their punishability in general in view of the current approach to punishable threats 
can arise in the case of many typical terrorist threats.
This is due to the fact that a typical “terrorist threat” within the meaning of 
the above-mentioned directive is, e.g., threatening to commit an offence against 
public security and such a threat is often addressed to a state body or mass media 
workers. Article 190 § 1 CC stipulates that the threat must be addressed towards 
a particular natural person and that the offence, the commission of which the perpe-
trator threatens, must be detrimental to either the addressee of the threat or a person 
closest to him or her. Already L. Peiper argued that a threat cannot be essentially 
addressed to a legal person because it cannot feel fear (unless it is apparent from 
the content of the threat that natural persons representing such a person are at risk)8. 
This author also stressed that the person against whom the threat is directed must 
7 The difficulties with the formulation of a synthetic definition of offence of a terrorist character 
have already emerged in the original wording of that provision, which required editorial intervention 
by the legislature, so that there is no doubt as to what the threat indicated at the end of the provision 
concerns. For more detail on this topic, see K. Wiak, op. cit., pp. 759–760.
8 L. Peiper, Komentarz do kodeksu karnego, prawa o wykroczeniach i przepisów wprowadza-
jących obie te ustawy, Kraków 1936, p. 506.





be precisely defined, although the threat does not need to be pronounced in his or 
her presence9. Such interpretation is consistently being adopted from the time of 
the Criminal Code of 1932 and seems fully reasonable in the light of the wording 
of Article 190 § 1 CC10.
However, this means that threatening a public authority, e.g. to poisoning a wa-
ter intake in a large city, does not amount to a punishable threat because in such 
a situation it would be difficult to assume that it is a threat to the detriment of any 
of the natural persons representing that authority and, moreover, it would not be 
possible to individualise in any way the persons to whose detriment the future 
offence would be committed. The latter, i.e. the lack of a specific potential victim, 
means that even the construct of indirect threat does not solve the problem. As 
noted in the literature, an indirect threat occurs when “the perpetrator, when in-
forming a third party of the threat, at least expected the threat to reach the victim 
and accepted this”11. For terrorist threats, e.g. aimed at forcing a state authority to 
a certain behaviour, it does not have to be the aim of the perpetrator that the threat 
reaches the potential persons at risk (it is the authority who is supposed to be forced 
to a certain behaviour by the threat of committing a terrorist attack), and in such 
cases it is quite likely that this authority would not make such threats public so as 
not to cause panic.
This aspect of the terrorist threat has already been pointed out by J. Majewski, 
who argued:
[…] an act consisting in presenting to a journalist living in Cracow the threat that an explosive 
will be detonated in the Warsaw metro, in the expectation that this information will become public, 
panic will outbreak in Warsaw and, thus, the aim of intimidation of many people will be achieved, 
is non-punishable. Although this act meets all the criteria of Article 115 § 20 for a terrorist offence, 
it is clear that the aforementioned provision itself cannot form a basis for criminal liability of the 
perpetrator12.
This problem also appeared in the case-law with regard to an “ordinary” pun-
ishable threat, leading to the conclusion that the behaviour of a perpetrator who 
spoke threats in the presence of persons who were not intended to be harmed by 
9 Ibidem.
10 See K. Nazar-Gutowska, Groźba bezprawna w polskim prawie karnym, Warszawa 2012, 
p. 141; M. Mozgawa, Przestępstwa przeciwko wolności, [in:] System Prawa Karnego, t. 10: Prze-
stępstwa przeciwko dobrom indywidualnym, red. J. Warylewski, Warszawa 2016, p. 433; A. Zoll, 
[in:] Kodeks karny. Część szczególna, t. 2: Komentarz, red. W. Wróbel, A. Zoll, Warszawa 2017, 
pp. 585–588; N. Kłączyńska, [in:] Kodeks karny. Część szczególna. Komentarz, red. J. Giezek, 
Warszawa 2014, p. 465; J. Kosonoga, [in:] Kodeks karny. Komentarz, red. R.A. Stefański, p. 1086; 
S. Hypś, [in:] Kodeks karny. Komentarz, red. A. Grześkowiak, K. Wiak, pp. 749–750.
11 M. Mozgawa, op. cit., p. 436. See also K. Daszkiewicz-Paluszyńska, Groźba w polskim prawie 
karnym, Warszawa 1958, pp. 137–13.
12 J. Majewski, op. cit., p. 1056.
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the announced offence does not constitute a criminal offence, while at the same 
time there was no ground to assume that the perpetrator at least accepted that his 
threats would reach their actual addressees. In the judgement of 13 February 2008, 
worth citing here, the Supreme Court, referring to the criteria of the offence under 
Article 190 § 1 CC, stated:
[…] a victim of this crime may, therefore, be only the person to whom this threat is addressed 
and who as a consequence could directly or indirectly (through the harm of the person closest to 
him) suffer damage as a result of this threat. All the police officers indicated as victims witnessed 
that the defendant threatened to blow up the building in which he lived, not immediately, but in the 
future, after leaving the correctional facility. Therefore, it cannot be said that he threatened to commit 
an offence to their detriment or to the detriment of their closest persons. None of the police officers 
performing activities with the defendant’s participation lived in this building, nor did the closest 
persons of any of them. The threat was clearly addressed to people who “slander” the defendant, i.e. 
to those of his neighbours who informed the police about Mirosław C.’s behaviour. None of these 
people were present in the defendant’s apartment when he was expressing his threats. Therefore, it 
cannot be assumed that the behaviour of the defendant met the criteria of prohibited act under Arti-
cle 190 § 1 CC. Of course, the threats expressed by him were unlawful, but this is not tantamount to 
punishability of such a conduct13.
This ruling confirms the generally accepted interpretation of this provision, 
which prevents deeming a number of typical “terrorist threats” as fulfilling the 
criteria of punishable threat, and without that condition, it is also impossible to 
consider them as unlawful threats. Even if trying to assume that, e.g. directing 
a threat to commit an offence against public security was an indirect threat, one 
cannot identify who specifically would be considered as a victim and whose feelings 
about the strength of the threat would be conclusive for the determination that this 
threat has raised a justified concern about its fulfilment. The fact that, for example, 
the state bodies responsible for security are convinced of the high likelihood of 
fulfilment of the threat is not sufficient in such a case, because it is not the members 
of such bodies who may be considered as directly threatened by the fulfilment of 
such threats. While, for example, in the case of a threat of blowing up a particular 
building, it could be assumed that all those staying there are the victims of such 
a threat, and their feeling of concern is sufficient to recognise that this element of 
threat occurred, in the case of many terrorist threats the perpetrators do not specify 
their target in such detail, and thus it is not possible to identify specific victims of 
their behaviour.
All this leads to the conclusion that considerable doubts arise as to whether 
the lawmaker has managed to criminalise “terrorist threat” to the extent probably 
intended and required by the above-mentioned EU Directive of 2017. Indeed, in 
13 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 13 February 2008, IV KK 407/07, „Biuletyn PK” 2008, 
No. 4, item 10.





many hypothetical situations the perpetrator’s act may prove to be de lege lata 
non-punishable, or, at most, prohibited under penalty as a petty offence, e.g. under 
Article 66 of the Code of Petty Offences (provided that the terrorist threat was 
addressed to a public service institution or security protection authority, public 
order authority or health authority)14. Nor does it seem permissible in this case to 
criminalise such threats through interpretation aimed at reconciling the existing 
scope of criminalisation with the requirements of EU law in that regard, since too 
much doubt arises, and interpreting the existing rules much more broadly, or even 
contra legem for achieving the effect of interpretation desirable from the point of 
view of the directive is incompatible with the guarantee function of criminal law.
These reservations may only be resolved through the intervention of the law-
maker, with two options for adapting the current legislation to the EU requirements 
and to the need of ensuring a proper criminal-law response to terrorist threats. The 
first one would involve a change in the wording of Article 190 § 1 CC so that it 
would also cover quite serious threats but lacking the individualised addressee. 
However, this solution does not seem appropriate, as it would mean a significant 
modification of the provision and almost complete departure from the approach to 
it that is traditional in Polish criminal law. The second option is the introduction to 
the Criminal Code (perhaps to the chapter grouping the crimes against public secu-
rity, or alternatively to the chapter covering crimes against public order) of a new 
type of crime of “terrorist threat”, while modifying the definition of Article 115 
§ 20 CC and the definition of unlawful threat contained in Article 115 § 12 CC15.
14 This problem has already emerged in the practice. In the judgement of the Administrative 
Court in Katowice of 26 February 2009 (II AKa 3/09, LEX No. 504097), in the grounds of which the 
court stated: “Under the legislation currently in force, the behaviour consisting in misleading public 
institutions or security and public order protection authorities by falsely informing them about the 
threats of terrorist attacks, planting explosives or other similar threats, must be considered on three 
possible levels of responsibility – petty offences under Article 66 of the Code of Petty Offences, 
crimes against freedom (Article 190 CC and Article 191 CC) and finally crimes against security in 
transport or public security (crimes from Chapters XX and XXI of the Penal Code). The type of legal 
interest violated or threatened by the perpetrator’s behaviour determines which of the possible legal 
qualifications is adequate in a given situation”. In the case in question, a judgement was repealed in 
which the perpetrators of a false alarm about bombs planted at several railway stations was assigned 
liability for the act under Article 174 § 1 CC in conjunction with Article 165 § 1 (5) CC.
15 It should be noted that the proposal for a separate penalisation of terrorist threat, other than 
the one outlined above, was presented by the Codification Committee of the Criminal law in its 
opinion of 18 February 2014 (see the opinion of the KKPK on the implementation of the current 
recommendations of MONEYVAL on anti-money laundering and other measures, www.gov.pl/
web/sprawiedliwosc/opinie-komisji-kodyfikacyjnej-prawa-karnego [access: 15.07.2019]). It was 
then postulated to introduce a new Article 259a penalising in § 1 the preparation for an offence of 
a terrorist character and penalising in § 2 the “use of a threat to commit a prohibited act of a terrorist 
character” punishable by imprisonment of up to 3 years.
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The new offence could, therefore, have the following shape: Article X. “Who-
ever, in order to seriously intimidate many people, force a body of public authority 
of the Republic of Poland or any other state or a body of an international organ-
ization to take or refrain from certain activities or to cause serious disturbances 
in the political system or economy of the Republic of Poland, another state or an 
international organization, threatens to commit a prohibited act punishable with 
a penalty of imprisonment of at least 5 years, shall be punished with […]”. It seems 
that, as regards the determination of the sanction, it would be appropriate to raise 
it in relation to that attributable for the “ordinary” punishable threat. In Article 115 
§ 20, the words “as well as a threat to commit such an act” should be deleted and 
instead the following sentence should be inserted: “An offence of a terrorist char-
acter is also a threat referred to in Article X”. The definition of unlawful threat from 
Article 115 § 12 CC should also be extended to include the new terrorist threat. 
It also seems that due to the specificity of terrorist threats, it is reasonable to give 
up specifying the addressee of the threat – the placing of the phrase “threatens an- 
other person” would mean the need to determine that the threat has been directed to 
a specific person, and this will not be always possible (e.g. the perpetrators spread 
leaflets announcing terrorist attacks). In this case, it is also groundless to require 
that the threat should cause justified fear about its fulfilment – the fact that it may be 
addressed to unspecified persons means that this element of the threat would also be 
difficult to prove (it would require, e.g. deciding whether the fear is to be felt by the 
person who received it, even though such a person is not among those who are to be 
harmed by the offence in the future, or rather the person potentially at risk – here, 
however, would be the problem of assessing who would be representative as such 
a victim). Therefore, an element to correct a too broad application of the provision 
would be, firstly, the general requirement for a higher than negligible degree of 
social harmfulness of the act, and secondly – the narrowly defined subjective side 
(mens rea) of the offence of terrorist threat. For this act to occur, it is necessary 
to prove the perpetrator’s activity in pursuance of one of the three terrorist goals, 
and this makes it possible to eliminate, e.g. threats meant as a joke or pronounced 
under the influence of momentary emotions, without the accompanying intention 
to achieve one of such goals.
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STRESZCZENIE
W artykule omówiono pojęcie groźby terrorystycznej na tle art. 115 § 20 k.k. Autorka zwróciła 
uwagę na relację tego pojęcia do ujętej w części szczególnej Kodeksu karnego groźby karalnej. Z prze-
prowadzonej analizy wynika, że groźba terrorystyczna musi być traktowana jako szczególny rodzaj 
groźby karalnej, a to powoduje, że wiele rzeczywistych gróźb terrorystycznych może nie wypełniać 
kryteriów czynu zabronionego, np. z uwagi na brak zindywidualizowanego pokrzywdzonego. Powyż-
sze sprawia, że można mieć poważne wątpliwości, czy polskie prawo karne spełnia wymogi unijne 
co do zakresu karalności gróźb terrorystycznych, dlatego zaproponowano wprowadzenie nowego 
typu przestępstwa groźby terrorystycznej oraz zmiany w brzmieniu art. 115 § 20 i art. 115 § 12 k.k.
Słowa kluczowe: terroryzm; groźba terrorystyczna; groźba karalna; przestępstwo o charakterze 
terrorystycznym
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